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INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses the question of whether non-US 
sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) should serve as a model for the 
United States in managing the Social Security Trust Fund. 
By law, the Social Security Trust Fund (“Trust Fund”) is 
required to invest only in special issue US government bonds,1 
which recently earned an annual nominal return of 4.6%.2 
However, over the long term, the stock market has an 
annualized nominal return of around 7.9%.3 In contrast to the 
US approach, many countries have recognized that the stock 
market yields higher returns and have successfully used SWFs to 
diversify holdings out of bonds and partially into stocks to help 
prefund their social insurance programs. Some countries using 
                                                                                                                                  
1. Office of the Chief Actuary, Trust Fund Data, SOC. SECURITY ONLINE, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/fundFAQ.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
2. BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST 
FUNDS, THE 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS 
INS. AND FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 112–23, at 25 (1st Sess. 
2011). Throughout this Article, I use the nominal return on stocks and bonds rather 
than the real return in order to be consistent. Although real returns would be the 
better measure of wealth building, since it takes into account inflation, most stock 
analysts only report nominal returns. See E.S. Browning, Adjusted for Inflation, Dow’s 
Gains Are Puny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748703991304574621903850508632.html (noting that analysts typically only report 
the rise of equities in nominal terms). 
3. ANTTI ILMANEN, EXPECTED RETURNS: AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO HARVESTING 
MARKET REWARDS 123 (2011). 
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this approach have achieved annualized returns of over eight 
percent.4 
This Article takes the view that the US should follow the 
lead of other countries and create an SWF to help prefund its 
social insurance obligations. Social Security is facing a funding 
crisis and the Trust Fund will be exhausted by 2036.5 Many 
reform proposals have been floated, yet most involve some sort 
of benefit cut or tax increase.6 In sharp contrast, investing the 
Trust Fund in equities could reduce the financing deficit by over 
thirty percent without increasing taxes or reducing benefits.7 
President Bill Clinton backed the idea, as did long-time Social 
Security Commissioner Robert Ball.8 
                                                                                                                                  
4. See Dimitri Vittas et al., Upgrading the Investment Policy Framework of Public Pension 
Funds 1–3 (Fin. Policy Div., World Bank Fin. Sys. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 4499, 
2008), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent
Server/IW3P/IB/2008/05/12/000158349_20080512143923/Rendered/PDF/
wps4499.pdf (analyzing the sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) of Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, and Norway); see also infra Part V (discussing the performance of SWFs that 
operate to fund social insurance plans). 
5. BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 2–3. For the purposes of this Article, I focus only 
on the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (“OASI”) Trust Fund, which funds Social 
Security benefits. The Social Security Administration also runs the Disability Insurance 
(“DI”) Trust Fund, which is facing a more imminent insolvency date of 2018. Both the 
Social Security Administration and policy analysts often combine the two programs and 
trust funds together and therefore report an insolvency date of 2036. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Social Security: Principles to Guide Reform, 
41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1078–82, 1078 n.109 (2008) (describing the means to 
increase revenue or decrease benefits in order to sustain Social Security funds). 
7. See Provisions Affecting Trust Fund Investment in Marketable Securities, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/investequities.html (last visited 
Nov. 12. 2011). The projection assumes that forty percent of the Trust Fund would 
gradually be invested in stocks over a period from 2011 to 2025 and that the investment 
would yield a real return of 6.4%. That would reduce the long-range actuarial balance 
from 1.92% of taxable payroll to 1.30%, an improvement of over thirty percent. See id. 
(under the G1 Provision, click “Summary measures and graphs” hyperlink). Proposals 
for investing the Trust assume that the funds would be invested in a broad-based index 
such as the Wilshire 5000. See U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, SOCIAL SECURITY 
MODERNIZATION: OPTIONS TO ADDRESS SOLVENCY AND BENEFIT ADEQUACY, S. Rep. No. 
111–187, at 50–51 (2d Sess. 2010). 
8. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Address before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 62, 63 (Jan. 19, 1999) (proposing a 
shift of up to sixty percent of the Social Security Trust Funds into index funds); Social 
Security at 75 Years: More Necessary Now than Ever: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. 
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Nancy J. Altman, 
Co-Director, Social Security Works). Although Democrats introduced a bill in Congress 
to implement President Clinton’s proposal, it died in committee. See Social Security Act 
 
2011] SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 101 
Despite the economic logic behind diversifying the Trust 
Fund, policymakers and politicians have not considered 
diversification in the most recent round of discussions on how to 
address the imminent funding crisis.9 One concern voiced is 
that market volatility could lead to lower returns during some 
periods of time and this might result in some generations having 
to pay higher taxes in order to fund benefits.10 Additionally, 
conservatives oppose the proposal on philosophical grounds, 
arguing that government investment is a form of socialism, 
which may result in political interference in private enterprise.11 
                                                                                                                                  
of 1998, H.R. 4076, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); Deborah M. Weiss, Pension Benefit and Legal 
Investment Law: The Regulation of Funded Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 993, 1016 n.61 
(1998). 
9. In 2010, President Obama issued an executive order to create the bipartisan 
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (“Fiscal Commission”) for 
the purpose of recommending measures “to improve the fiscal situation in the medium 
term and to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run.” Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 
Fed. Reg. 7,927 (Feb. 23, 2010). Social Security reform was just one of the issues 
addressed by the Fiscal Commission’s December 2010 report. While the report 
included a number of proposals that would cut benefits and increase taxes, there was 
no discussion of Trust Fund investment. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/
TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf (discussing various recommendations to achieve 
solvency). 
10. See Kent A. Smetters, Thinking about Social Security’s Trust Fund, in PROSPECTS 
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 201, 206–07, 208–10 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999). 
See generally Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The Future of Social Security, 52 J.L. & 
POL. 395 (2006) (discussing market risk as it relates to investment reform proposals for 
Social Security). 
11. See Investing in Private Markets: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 41–43 (1999) (statement of Michael Tanner, 
Director, Health and Welfare Studies, Cato Institute), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings
&docid=f:57507.pdf (discussing the dangers of political influence and interference 
through government investment). President George W. Bush adamantly opposed 
government investment—preferring instead to push a private accounts model. 
President Bush’s commission to study reform stated unequivocally that the government 
must not make the investment decision. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. 
SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL 
AMERICANS 13 (2001), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/csss/reports/
Final_report.pdf. See generally Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: 
Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010) 
(discussing more thoroughly the institutional norms that discourage government 
investment). 
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This Article seeks to address whether the success of non-US 
SWFs will lend credibility to the diversification proposal. The 
Article uses the methodology of new institutionalism to discuss 
what forces might help create the political will necessary to 
adopt this policy proposal. Part I of this Article analyzes the 
political opposition to government investment of the Social 
Security Trust Fund. The focus is to define the philosophical 
and pragmatic reasons behind the opposition to the proposal. 
Part II discusses new institutionalism as it relates to government 
investment, in order to give a framework to analyze how certain 
political economies change and adapt. The next two Parts look 
at forces that may drive change in the U.S. political economy. 
Part III addresses the Social Security funding crisis and Part IV 
discusses the gradual adoption of government investment as a 
policy matter over the last thirty years. Part V addresses the 
historical development of SWFs as financial intermediaries and 
the changing perceptions over their role in global financial 
stability. Part VI discusses SWFs as a model for the U.S. Social 
Security Trust Fund. 
I. POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT 
One of the most promising long-term reforms for the Social 
Security funding crisis is the full funding model, whereby social 
insurance would be funded not only by tax contributions but 
also by investments made by the government in a diversified 
portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other assets.12 Despite the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009, economists agree that over time, a 
diversified portfolio will outperform a bond-only portfolio.13 The 
obstacle in advancing a full-funding model is not in the 
economic realities but in the norms of a neo-liberal political 
economy. 
From the inception of Social Security, conservative 
politicians have adamantly opposed government investment as a 
                                                                                                                                  
12. See Templin, supra note 11, at 448 (discussing advantages of a truly diversified 
portfolio). 
13. See JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO 
FINANCIAL MARKET RETURNS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, 24–36 (4th ed. 
2008) (explaining the financial benefits of investing in stocks over bonds). 
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funding mechanism.14 The opposition is rooted in political 
beliefs about the proper role of government in a market 
economy. The argument advanced is that, when the government 
participates as a shareholder in private enterprise, four distinct 
issues threaten to disrupt a market-based economy: (1) the 
government’s lack of expertise in managing assets will lead to 
waste; (2) political interference will result in a lack of wealth 
maximization; (3) the government will coercively interfere in 
corporate governance, thus affecting firm efficiency; and (4) it is 
impossible for the state to act as both a shareholder and a 
regulator, since those roles result in an inherent conflict of 
interest.15 
The fears of conservatives about government investment 
came true when the US Treasury made several investments 
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) under 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 during the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009.16 The Treasury paid more for assets 
than private investors, thereby lowering the eventual return on 
investment.17 Political influence was exerted in the investment 
decision, and the executive branch was actively involved in 
corporate governance.18 While government investment under 
TARP was soundly and justifiably criticized for failing to achieve 
its goals, many of the investments ended up in the black.19 In 
some respects, the mismanagement under TARP helped define 
the issues surrounding government investment so that proposals 
could be put forward to help limit political interference in the 
investment cycle.20 
                                                                                                                                  
14. See Lewis D. Solomon & Bryan L. Berson, Private Market Reforms for Social 
Security: A Comprehensive Guide for Composing Reform Legislation, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
117, 123 (2001) (discussing the history of the political debate surrounding government 
investment). 
15. See Templin, supra note 11, at 431–32. 
16. See generally Templin, supra note 11 (documenting the numerous investments 
made under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)). 
17. Id. at 1158–61. 
18. Id. at 1163–70, 1184–96. 
19. Brady Dennis, TARP Profitable as Some Loan Repayments Filter in, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 31, 2011, at A18. 
20. See Templin, supra note 11, at 1198–214. 
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Some political actors and commentators contend that 
government investment is inconsistent with the neoliberal 
political economy that exists within the United States.21 In this 
view, government investment may occur successfully in other 
types of political economies, such as the state capitalism system 
found in China, but adopting those methods in the United 
States disrupts free market principles.22 However, recent work in 
comparative capitalism studies suggests political economies are 
flexible enough to change, adapt, and adopt methods used by 
states even if such methods have historically run counter to the 
character of a particular type of capitalism.23 The next section 
will discuss the new institutional framework for analyzing how a 
particular political economy changes its rules of the game—that 
is, its institutions. 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Much of the opposition to government investment in a 
neoliberal economy rests on the belief that methods used in a 
state capitalist system would cause inefficiencies if applied in a 
free marketplace. The new institutionalism and comparative 
capitalism literature offers a framework to analyze the role of 
government investment in different types of market economies. 
The rise of the new institutionalism school of thought has done 
much in the area of comparative capitalism studies to address 
how and why different societies develop different laws and rules 
of the game. 
Increasingly, legal scholars are drawing on interdisciplinary 
studies in order to gain an understanding of the forces which 
dictate how actors operate. New institutionalism concerns the 
development of rules of the game that limit the behavior of 
people and firms. Although economists have developed 
different definitions, there is general agreement that institutions 
include both formal and informal rules. Formal rules include 
statutes, regulations, court decisions, and, of course, 
constitutions; while informal rules consist of societal norms and 
                                                                                                                                  
21. See id. at 1156–57. 
22. See id. at 1152–98.  
23. See COLIN CROUCH, CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND CHANGE, RECOMBINANT 
GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS 6 (2005). 
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customs. If an actor breaks a formal rule, he may be subject to 
penalties. However, actors are not legally obligated to follow 
informal norms, though failure to do so may result in an 
unofficial penalty.24 
Economists disagree over the method in which an 
institution develops and changes over time.25 Path dependence 
is a leading theory that describes a process where rules of the 
game become so dominant in an economy and actors’ behavior 
that changing the rule becomes nearly impossible, even if it is 
economically rational to make a change.26 The political 
bargaining process influences the development of formal 
institutions, so that the development of a rule might reflect 
compromises between different interest groups.27 When an 
institution is used repeatedly in a political economy, it starts to 
dominate and evolve into the default rule. Any actors who 
attempt to use a different rule meet resistance since the 
entrenched rule has supporters who benefit from its 
application.28 
Economists Peter Hall and David Soskice adopt path 
dependence theory for their varieties of capitalism model.29 Hall 
and Soskice posit that political economies can generally be 
categorized according to two types—a liberal market economy 
(“LME”) or a coordinated market economy (“CME”).30 Hall 
and Soskice do not consider either type as superior.31 The 
development of an LME or CME is the result of culture and the 
historical choices made by actors within a region.32 Perhaps the 
most significant result of Hall and Soskice’s work was that it 
challenged the theory that globalization necessarily results in a 
                                                                                                                                  
24. See PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 12–14 (2001) (discussing 
the role that informal rules play in institutions). 
25. See CROUCH, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
26. See id. at 74–75 (noting the many scholars who have contributed to the path 
dependence theory). 
27. See id. at 7 (providing US intellectual property law as an example of such 
compromises). 
28. See id. at 1–2. 
29. See id. at 2. 
30. HALL & SOSKICE, supra note 24, at 8. 
31. Id. at 20–21. 
32. Id. at 12–14. 
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gradual convergence among states towards global adoption of 
the neoliberal model.33 
Government investment for the purpose of funding social 
insurance can be seen as an institution that is consistent with 
CMEs, such as those found in Europe or Asia, rather than LMEs, 
such as in the United States. Assuming that path dependence 
theory is correct, then government investment of the US Social 
Security Trust Fund is unlikely to occur. Even though it might 
be economically rational to diversify the Trust Fund, political 
actors will resist changing the dominant rules of the game that 
limit government investment since to do so would be 
inconsistent with the US neoliberal political economy.34 
Not all socio-economists, however, agree with the theory of 
path dependence. Some contend that LMEs can and do adopt 
institutions from CMEs without experiencing inefficiencies.35 
The process of institutional change may occur when a particular 
economy experiences a crisis.36 The 2007–2009 financial crisis 
illustrates how a crisis can change the rules of the game within 
the US economy. The US Treasury and Federal Reserve made 
massive investments in private financial institutions during the 
collapse of the credit markets.37 Government investment of this 
type was clearly an institution more likely to be used by a CME 
than an LME, and the intervention is still controversial even 
though the bailout of financial institutions under the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program yielded a better return for taxpayers than if 
the same amount had been invested in government bonds.38 
Institutions also change incrementally over time.39 The rate 
of change is a factor of the embeddedness of an institution—
                                                                                                                                  
33. See CROUCH, supra note 23, at 24–25. 
34. See Templin, supra note 11, at 1157–84. 
35. See CROUCH, supra note 23, at 30. 
36. See id. at 3. 
37. See Sewell Chan & Jo Craven McGinty, In Crisis, Fed Opened Vault Wide for U.S. 
and World, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the US Federal 
Reserve utilized US$1.5 trillion in outstanding credit to provide liquidity). 
38. See Templin, supra note 11, at 1129–30; see also Yalman Onaran & Alexis 
Leondis, Bank Bailout Returns 8.2% Beating Treasury Yields, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2010, 
10:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2010-10-20/bailout-of-wall-street-returns
-8-2-profit-to-taxpayers-beating-treasuries.html. 
39. See CROUCH, supra note 23, at 75 (noting scholars who developed this theory 
of cumulative change). 
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that is, the degree to which a particular society has integrated 
that institution into its cultural, political, and economic 
systems.40 Some socio-economists have posited that rapid change 
occurs even without a crisis. Social and political scientist Colin 
Crouch has recently challenged new institutionalists with the 
notion of slow progressive change through a theory of 
recombinant governance. Under this approach, institutional 
entrepreneurs have recombined different elements of what are 
traditionally considered non-complementary—that is, 
duplicative institutions to address social and economic issues.41 
Crouch criticizes the varieties of capitalism school for being one 
dimensional and not reflecting the more heterogeneous way in 
which political economies operate.42 Crouch challenges classic 
new institutional theory by positing that a society with 
“institutional heterogeneity” has more tools to address issues 
when a particular path is no longer working.43 In this view, 
institutional change occurs when the rule’s governance is 
changed.44 If the institution is no longer followed by the actors 
in an economy, then the enforcement or governance of that 
institution weakens.45 
Crouch’s approach posits that both neoliberal and 
centralized political economies can share institutional norms 
and rules without experiencing disruption. This view of the 
development of governing institutions suggests the US could 
begin to shift the Trust Fund into a diversified portfolio without 
affecting the nature of the political economy. 
This Article will next address three catalysts that may 
operate to change the institutions surrounding government 
investment of the Trust Fund:(1) the impending solvency crisis; 
(2) incremental change in belief systems on the role of 
government in the US political economy; and (3) the presence 
of non-US SWFs as models for reform. 
                                                                                                                                  
40. See id. at 13 (noting the scholars who have contributed to this theory of 
embeddedness). 
41. See id. at 3 (describing the analysis Crouch undertakes). 
42. See id. at 22–23. 
43. See id. at 71. 
44. See id. at 24. 
45. See id. at 22. 
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III. FUNDING CRISIS AS A CATALYST FOR CHANGE 
The funding crisis facing Social Security has been a 
controversial policy issue for decades, yet little significant reform 
has been made since the 1983 Social Security Amendments, 
which established increases in the employment tax and raised 
the retirement age, among other changes.46 The well-accepted 
actuarial predictions of the Social Security Administration are 
that the Social Security Trust Fund will be insolvent by 2036.47 
Yet, Congress has lacked the political will to address this issue, 
and conventional political theory contends that an imminent 
crisis will be necessary to move a bill on Social Security 
forward.48 This Part first considers the nature of the funding 
crisis and then details how Trust Fund diversification would 
reduce the funding deficit. 
A. Social Security Funding Crisis 
Social Security is widely acknowledged as the most 
important program in preventing poverty among elderly 
Americans,49 yet it faces insolvency because of demographic, 
economic, and structural problems. In its most recent annual 
report, the Social Security Administration reported that under 
its intermediate scenario the Trust Fund reserves will be 
exhausted by 2036.50  
                                                                                                                                  
46. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–21, 97 Stat. 65, available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/1983amend2.html. I use the term employment tax 
rather than the more common term “payroll tax” because it more accurately captures 
the fact that Social Security is funded not just through payroll deductions, but also 
through taxing self-employed workers. See Richard Winchester, The Gap in the 
Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 127–28 (2009). 
47. See BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 2–3.  
48. Kathryn L. Moore, Reforming Retirement Systems: Why the French Have Succeeded 
When Americans Have Not, 22 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 251, 289 (2005). 
49. Kathryn L. Moore, The Privatization Process: Redistribution under a Partially 
Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 990 (1998) (stating that Social 
Security benefits prevent fifty percent of the elderly from living below the poverty line). 
Some scholars dispute these claims. See, e.g., SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, 
THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 208 (1999). Schieber 
and Shoven argue that the claims of the effectiveness of the program are exaggerated 
because the SSA does not include all sources of income for the elderly (such as 
payments from private pensions) in its calculation. Id. 
50. BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 2–3. 
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The funding problems for Social Security arise from a 
system called pay as you go (“PAYGO”), which has proven 
inadequate as a financing tool in light of demographic changes. 
Under PAYGO, the employment tax from the current 
generation of workers pays the benefits of current retirees.51 Any 
excess is put into the Trust Fund.52 So long as there is a high 
worker to beneficiary ratio, such a system is sustainable. 
However, because of a population bulge as a result of the Baby 
Boom generation as well as longer life expectancies, the worker 
to beneficiary ratio is declining.53 This means there are fewer 
people paying into the system and more people receiving 
benefits.54 
Other forces have also put pressure on the Trust Fund. 
Unemployment increased dramatically after the subprime 
financial crisis started in 2007, and the economic recovery has 
not proceeded as quickly as was originally predicted, resulting in 
lower predictions by the Social Security Administration as to the 
level of earnings and therefore revenue generated through the 
employment tax.55 In 2010, the revenue generated by the 
employment tax was less than the amount of benefits paid out,56 
which meant the Social Security Administration had to use Trust 
Fund reserves to pay out benefits.57 Initially, in 2010, the Social 
Security Administration expected employment tax revenues to 
improve and generate enough revenue to cover 2012 benefits.58 
However, by 2011, the Social Security Administration conceded 
                                                                                                                                  
51. See Eric Schurenberg, The Real Risk to Social Security, CBS MONEYWATCH, Jan. 
30, 2011, http://moneywatch.bnet.com/retirement-planning/blog/financial-
independence/the-real-risk-to-social-security/1186/. 
52. Id. 
53. See BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 10. 
54. See id. 
55  See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (data extracted Nov. 7, 2011, 
10:38 PM); BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 73.  
56. See BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 143. The net benefits in 1983 were US$149.2 
billion but only US$138.3 billion was collected in taxes. All net contributions for the 
period from 1984 to 2009 were greater than the benefits paid out. Id. at 142–43. 
57. See id. at 2. 
58. See BD. OF TRS., supra note 2, at 2–3, 37–38. 
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that the employment tax revenue would no longer by itself cover 
outgoing benefits in either the short- or long-term outlook.59 
Since the Trust Fund investments are composed entirely of 
non-marketable, special issue US bonds, the Treasury has to pay 
interest to the Trust Fund in order for recipients to receive 
benefits.60 This has added an additional strain on Treasury’s 
general budget, since there have been increased net operating 
costs, shrinking tax revenues that resulted from the 2007–2009 
recession, and tax cuts passed as part of a stimulus package.61 
B. Trust Fund Diversified Portfolio Returns 
Investing the Trust Fund in a diversified portfolio could 
reduce the funding deficit. In a 2010 report, the US Senate 
reported that investing a portion of the Trust Fund into 
securities that represented a broad based index, such as the 
Wilshire 5000, might eliminate as much as one-third of the 
deficit.62 Does the market for stocks really outperform a bond-
                                                                                                                                  
59. See id. at 36 (showing that net payroll tax contributions are not expected to 
exceed benefit payments under the intermediate assumptions). 
60. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2009 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 11–14 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
financial/ fy2009/09frusg.pdf. 
61. See id. at iii, 14. 
62. U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 7, at 50–51. The predictions 
of the extent that portfolio diversification can improve the funding problem vary 
depending on, among other factors, the diversification model. Several studies have 
predicted a wide range of results. Other studies date back as far as the mid-1990s and 
make the assumption that the Trust Fund would have been diversified long ago. 
Consequently, estimates would have to be readjusted for an accurate estimate of the 
returns available in the post-subprime crisis environment. With that in mind, the older 
studies are illuminating. The Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) reported that 
shifting from bonds to stocks only would have bought the Trust Fund only another 
eleven years. See Solomon & Berson, supra note 14, at 136. Other studies were more 
conservative. Barry Bosworth and Gary Burtless created a model that shifted thirty 
percent of the Trust Fund from bonds into equities, then made other changes, such as 
increasing the employment tax, and were only able to delay the inevitable funding 
crisis for another sixteen years. Whereas, when they put seventy percent of the Trust 
into equities, the model predicted that the Trust Fund could last another fifty-three 
years. Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless, The Effects of Social Security Reform on Saving, 
Investment, and the Level and Distribution of Worker Well-Being 6 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at 
Bos. Coll., Working Paper No.2002–02, 2002). The model also assumed that an 
immediate tax rate hike of two percent occurred in the year 2000, and thus these 
numbers may vary somewhat when applied to the current size of the trust and the 
current predictions on the rate of decline. See id. at 3. Yet another study predicted that 
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only portfolio? Can a publicly run investment fund achieve the 
same results as a privately managed hedge fund or mutual fund? 
This section will first examine market returns for stocks over the 
long-term and then analyze data for publicly-run government 
employee pension funds. 
The benefits of a diversified portfolio are not controversial. 
A fully diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other assets 
routinely outperforms a bond-only portfolio over long periods 
of time and it does so with less risk.63 Equities generate an 
average annualized return of approximately 7.9%, which is a 
2.68% premium over risk-free US Treasury securities.64 The data 
also supports shorter holding periods. Professor Jeremy Siegel of 
the Wharton School of Business found that over thirty-year 
periods, stocks outperform bonds 99.4% of the time.65 Although 
bonds are generally perceived to be safer investments than 
securities, government treasuries are actually at-risk of losing 
value because of inflation over long periods of time. Using 200 
years of data, Siegel showed that over seventeen-year periods, 
bonds are at-risk of the inflation rate exceeding the rate of 
return on the bonds, however, stocks have never had a negative 
return in the same periods.66 
Any fund is, however, only as good as its investment 
strategy. One question that arises with the introduction of such 
massive wealth into the equity markets is whether any given fund 
that large can yield similar returns. Can a government-run Social 
Security fund achieve the same returns as a private pension 
plan?67 Public employee pension plans provide some data 
points. A Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service reported 
that publicly-run employee pension funds in the United States 
                                                                                                                                  
shifting forty percent of the Trust Fund out of bonds and into stocks, along with other 
changes, would keep Social Security funded for another seventy-five years. Theodore J. 
Angelis, Investing Public Money in Private Markets: What are the Right Questions?, in 
FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 287, 288 
(R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998). 
63. See SIEGEL, supra note 13, at 24–36.  
64. See ILMANEN, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
65. See SIEGEL, supra note 13, at 26. 
66. See id. at 24–27. 
67. See U.S. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE 
ECONOMY 22 (1998). 
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slightly outperformed other funds for the first quarter of 2011 
and the preceding twelve months.68 The anecdotal evidence also 
shows that some public employee funds achieve competitive 
returns when they invest with large equity positions.69 The 
Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System rose 21.23% in 
2010 due largely to the fact that sixty-four percent of its portfolio 
is invested in both domestic and international stocks.70 
Annualized averages for some public funds outperform market 
returns. Florida’s Retirement System’s defined benefit plan 
investments have an 8.79% annualized return over the last 
twenty years, compared with an average market return of 7.9%.71  
Indeed, most public employee and private pension funds 
invest at least a portion of their assets in the stock market.72 The 
average pension fund invests sixty percent in domestic equities.73 
As of the first quarter of 2011, private pension plans had US$2.1 
trillion invested in corporate equities, and public employee 
pensions plans (including federal, state and local plans) had 
US$2 trillion invested in stocks.74 Together, private and public 
pensions account for about seventeen percent of all direct 
investments in corporate equities.75 Given the prevalence of 
pension funds investing in stocks, Congress would likely have 
                                                                                                                                  
68. See Timothy Inklebarger, Public Funds Perform Best in Wilshire TUCS, PENSIONS 
& INVESTMENTS (May 4, 2011, 3:54 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20110504/
DAILYREG/110509952#ixzz1SlnD7iUa. 
69. See Timothy Inklebarger et al., Double-Digit Percentage Returns for 5 Pension 
Funds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (July 22, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.pionline.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110722/DAILYREG/110729954/1034/
PIDailyUpdate01&issuedate=20110722.  
70. See id.  
71. See Barry B. Burr, Florida Pension Plan Returns 22%, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 
(July 20, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20110720/DAILYREG/
110729988/-1/TOPIC (describing the annualized rate of the Florida Retirement 
System’s benefit plan investments over the last twenty years); ILMANEN, supra note 3, at 
123 (noting the average market return over the last twenty years). 
72. U.S. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 67, at 3. 
73. See id. 
74. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FED. RES. STATISTICAL RELEASE 
Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, 
FIRST QUARTER 2011, 92 tbl.L.213 (2011). 
75. See id. 
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already approved Trust Fund diversification if it were not for 
concerns about political investment.76 
IV. GRADUAL ADOPTION OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AS 
A POLICY INITIATIVE 
Despite political rhetoric to the contrary, US economic 
policy has incrementally changed over the last thirty years to the 
point that government investment in private enterprise occurs 
frequently even if the political rhetoric suggests otherwise. From 
an institutional change perspective, the previous constraints on 
government investment have slowly faded as the governance of 
the institution changed.77 
Even before the financial crisis surfaced, the United States 
has increasingly been an investor in private enterprise for the 
purposes of economic development. Sociologist Fred Block 
argues that despite political rhetoric to the contrary, the United 
States actually started pursuing a government-led investment 
policy on a major scale as early as the 1980s, and that this state-
guided investment for policy-driven research and development 
projects has changed the US national innovation system such 
that most research and development now has some sort of 
government support and investment behind it.78 
In describing initiatives to promote economic development 
in each of the fifty states, scholar Peter Eisinger distinguished 
the supply-side market policies of the Reagan era with a state-
driven demand-side model where the state actively formed 
partnerships with business. Since Eisinger’s study is focused on 
the competition among the fifty states, it holds possible 
                                                                                                                                  
76. See Smetters, supra note 10, at 206. It would be likely that if any other 
managers of pension plans pursued a bond-only investment approach, they would be 
severely reprimanded for wasting the opportunity to earn higher returns. See ROBERT 
M. BALL ET AL., 1994–1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A STRATEGY TO MAINTAIN BENEFITS AND STRENGTHEN 
AMERICA’S FAMILY PROTECTION PLAN (1996), available at http://www.ssa.gov/ history/
reports/adcouncil/report/ball1.htm. 
77. See CROUCH, supra note 23, at 24. 
78. See Fred Block, Swimming against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental 
State in the United States, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 169, 187 (2008). 
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implications for how non-US states compete in investment.79 In 
the demand-side model, there is an acceptance that investors 
may not be aware of some economic opportunities or be risk 
averse when “there is no immediately apparent, easily accessible 
market.”80 Consequently, the state seeks to ferret out or create 
those opportunities and then find investors to fund the 
ventures.81 
The entrepreneurial state fosters opportunity for businesses 
through “efforts to encourage small business participation in 
export trade, to subsidize technology transfer from university 
laboratories to the market, and to underwrite research and 
production in technologically advanced fields . . . .”82 
Sometimes, the role of the entrepreneurial state is as 
matchmaker and other times as investor. When the capital 
markets are insufficient to fund a business opportunity, the state 
might take on the role of venture capitalist (“VC”)—providing 
start-up capital, financing research and funding export 
ventures.83 State investment is critical when there is market 
failure or high-risk and promising ventures that cannot attract 
adequate capital.84 For example, state-run venture capital funds 
intervened to finance technology start-ups after the dot-com 
bubble burst and private VC funding had dissipated.85 
Yet, within the demand-side model that Eisinger lays out, 
the investment opportunities are less market-driven and more 
policy-driven. The investments documented by Eisinger are 
those typically benefiting a region with an aim towards job 
creation rather than wealth creation.86 Normatively, Eisinger’s 
entrepreneurial state should in fact pursue such policy goals. 
Eisinger is not against wealth creation; rather his assumption is 
                                                                                                                                  
79. See id. at 150 (“Interjurisdictional competition is one of the abiding principles 
of American federalism.”). See generally David M. Hart, The Politics of “Entrepreneurial” 
Economic Development Policy of States in the U.S., 25 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 149 (2008).  
80. PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE 229 (1988). 
81. See id. at 228. 
82. See id. at 229. 
83. See id. at 234. 
84. See id. at 242–43. 
85. See generally Gene J. Koprowski, State-Run Venture Funds Picking Up Slack for 
Private VCs, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Dec. 13, 2005, 5:00 AM), http://www.ecommerce
times.com/story/47747.html?wlc=1315249725. 
86. See EISINGER, supra note 80, at 257. 
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that it is a natural function of the state to invest only when there 
is some other policy-driven goal related to the actual 
investment.87 
The evidence of whether investment by the entrepreneurial 
state realizes a financial return is inconclusive, though some 
programs show “not only a positive employment effect for firms 
using the program, but also a net fiscal gain for the state 
government.”88 Reports on the success of such funds often focus 
on jobs created or some other performance benchmark as well 
as net return.89 Some regional focused funds have done 
extraordinarily well. Maryland Venture Fund, run by the 
Maryland Department of Business and Economic Development, 
produced a whopping substantial annual rate of return of thirty 
percent over its first ten years of operation, whereas the average 
rate of return for the venture capital industry is twenty to twenty-
five percent.90 While small-scale grant projects, such as those 
found in the biotech industry, have been successful, the 
entrepreneurial-state-financed public-private technology 
infrastructure projects, such as household high-speed 
broadband, have failed, leaving the United States strong in some 
areas and weak in others.91 
The largest program of government investment came about 
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 when the government 
invested US$512.3 billion in private enterprise through a variety 
of programs.92 Two pieces of emergency legislation drove the 
investments—the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
(EESA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009.93 The bulk of the funds invested were through the EESA, 
which authorized TARP and other investments, and were 
justified by a theory of Keynesian economics.94 While Keynesian 
                                                                                                                                  
87. See id. 
88. Hart, supra note 79, at 153. 
89. See, e.g., Koprowski, supra note 85. 
90. See id. 
91. See Block, supra note 78, at 193. 
92. Templin, supra note 11, at 1129. For a breakdown of the investments and the 
programs under which they were made, see id. at 1129 n.4. 
93. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–
5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
94. See Templin, supra note 11, at 1148–52. 
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economics has been used by US policymakers before this, there 
had been a shift to less interventionist policies during the 
Ronald Reagan presidency when monetarism and Milton 
Friedman’s laissez-faire theories dominated US policy.95 
Although the change to a Keynesian approach was driven 
partially by crisis, the shift towards government investment was 
at an unprecedented level, suggesting greater acceptance of 
such an approach among the polity. Interestingly, the 
investments made under TARP were initiated by President 
George W. Bush. Although President Bush opposed government 
investment for the purpose of the Social Security Trust Fund, he 
was able to adopt the tool in another crisis.96 
While much has been written about waste, mismanagement, 
and political interference with the TARP investments, the 
program is widely considered to have been successful in 
resolving the financial crisis, and it did so while turning a small 
profit for taxpayers on some of the investments.97 However, as of 
July 2011, the Treasury still holds investments made during the 
crisis, such as its stock in AIG, and the ultimate return to the 
taxpayer will depend on external factors such as the general 
health of the economy and the performance of the insurance 
industry in general.98 
Interestingly, some subtle shifts occurred during the 
financial crisis in the rules of the game that constrain 
government investment. One institutional constraint is the 
preference for short holding periods, even if it means that the 
government does not recoup the full value of an investment.99 
However, some government investments made during the 
financial crisis are purposefully being held longer than 
originally contemplated in order to more fully recoup the cost 
to taxpayers. While initially it was contemplated that AIG would 
sell various assets and divisions in initial public offerings by 
2010, in order to try and repay the US government investment, a 
                                                                                                                                  
95. See id. at 1150–51. 
96. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 11, at 13. 
97. See Dennis, supra note 19, at A18. 
98. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-716, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO AIG FOLLOWING THE COMPANY’S 
RECAPITALIZATION 32 (2011). 
99. See Templin, supra note 11, at 1176–78. 
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new board and chief executive officer changed course stating it 
might take longer to get a fair price.100 The direction was clearly 
towards maximizing the price of the assets in order to repay the 
government in full.101 This approach stands in stark contrast to 
prior institutional norms, which constrained the government in 
terms of holding periods. This is not to say that an early exit is 
no longer a goal of such investments. In contemplating the sale 
of its stake in General Motors and Chrysler, the Treasury has to 
balance its competing goals of an early exit with recouping the 
cost, which would require holding onto the stock until the share 
price rises.102 
While problems with political interference in government 
investment occurred under the TARP program, proposals have 
been made to create legal boundaries and norms to reduce, if 
not eliminate, political influence in government investment.103 
Some excellent models already exist in the management of 
existing SWFs. 
V. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: PRE– AND POST–FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
The rapid growth, size, and success of investments in non-
US SWFs for the purpose of financing social insurance may also 
provide a model for a diversified Trust Fund.104 
SWFs have attracted increased attention and concern in the 
last five years. Given the increase in numbers as well as the size 
of some funds, commentators have noted that SWFs are a new 
class of financial intermediary with the potential to threaten 
global macroeconomic stability and sustainability.105 Global and 
national responses to the threat posed by non-US SWFs have 
varied between “hard law” approaches, such as national laws 
prohibiting or deterring international investment and binding 
                                                                                                                                  
100. See id. at 1173. 
101. See id. 
102. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-471, TARP: TREASURY’S 
EXIT FROM GM AND CHRYSLER HIGHLIGHTS COMPETING GOALS, AND RESULTS OF 
SUPPORT TO AUTO COMMUNITIES ARE UNCLEAR 19 (2011). 
103. See generally Templin, supra note 11 (describing several proposals). 
104. See Vittas et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
105. See, e.g., EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? 46–51 (2010) 
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international treaties, and “soft law” approaches, such as non-
binding voluntary codes of conduct.106 Hard law approaches 
involving restrictions may result in protectionism that damages 
global trade, yet soft, voluntary standards, by definition, lack any 
form of enforcement mechanism. 
After the role they played in the financial crisis of 2007–
2009, SWFs are, however, beginning to be perceived as less 
threatening and as financial intermediaries. In particular, SWFs 
focused on funding social insurance programs are considered to 
not pose the threat to global stability that strategic funds might 
pose. This Part first discusses concerns raised about SWFs by the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the responses that 
have developed to address those concerns. This Part then 
addresses how the attitudes towards SWFs have shifted, given the 
role that some SWFs played as investors adding liquidity during 
the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
A. New Class of Financial Intermediary 
Although SWFs have existed since the 1950s, policy analysts 
raised the alarm in 2007 about potential manipulation as SWFs 
grew in size.107 Projections originally suggested the funds would 
grow to US$10 trillion by 2012.108 In a widely quoted study at the 
time, Morgan Stanley predicted similar results with an estimated 
US$12 trillion in assets by 2015.109 However, those estimates are 
now considered inaccurate. At the start of 2011, SWFs held an 
                                                                                                                                  
106. International law scholars use “soft law” to mean “norms that are not 
thought of as law per se but compel a law-like sense of obligation in states.” Allison 
Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 
(2007). In contrast, “hard law” includes “customary law” and binding treaties in the 
international context. Id. at 328 n.15. 
107. See Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2007, 
at 56, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/pdf/
straight.pdf 
108. See id. at 56. 
109. Stephen Jen, Currencies: How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds Be by 2015?, 
MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL ECON. FORUM (May 4, 2007), http://www.morgan
stanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070504-Fri.html#anchored3a90be-419e-11de-
a1b3-c771ef8db296. 
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estimated US$3.98 trillion in assets.110 Although SWFs lost an 
estimated US$200 billion during the financial crisis of 2007–
2009, most of those losses are expected to be recovered since 
SWFs are generally long-term investors.111 Additionally, new 
money flowed into some SWFs as a result of increases in 
commodity prices and those assets will need to be invested.112 
Some funds are controlled by oil rich nations such as the 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Russia.113 However, China 
has also placed reserves in its funds.114 Not all SWFs are 
controlled by countries that are sometimes at political odds with 
the United States on the international stage. Norway controls 
one of the largest funds.115 Indeed, the state of Alaska appears 
on most lists of SWFs because of the Alaska Permanent Fund—a 
state-owned investment vehicle for oil and mineral licensing 
fees.116 
Three trends help explain the wealth creation of SWFs: (1) 
dependence on oil; (2) low-cost manufacturing in Asia; and (3) 
smart money management of public pension funds by forward-
thinking developed countries—for example, Canada and 
Norway. Oil rich nations, such as Dubai, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
Russia, gained wealth through western dependence, high 
consumption, and rising prices. In contrast, low labor costs in 
Asia, as well as monetary policies pegging local currencies to the 
                                                                                                                                  
110. Wendy Chothia, Sovereign Wealth Fund Total Assets Swell to USD4trn, PRIVATE 
EQUITY WIRE, Mar. 9, 2011, available at http://www.privateequitywire.co.uk/2011/03/
09/109260/sovereign-wealth-fund-total-assets-swell-usd4trn. 
111. Nadim Kawach, SWF Losses Nominal during Financial Crisis, EMIRATES 24/7 
(July 25, 2010), http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/swf-losses-
nominal-during-financial-crisis-2010-07-25-1.270518. 
112. See SWF Assets Eclipse $3 Trillion, IDD MAGAZINE (Mar. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.preqin.com/itemProduct.aspx?s=101&itemid=1279. 
113. See Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 179, 202–04 (2008). 
114. Id. at 214. 
115. See SWF Institute, Fund Rankings: Largest Funds by Assets under Management, 
SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited Nov. 12, 
2011) (listing Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global as being the second largest 
SWF by assets under management in 2011). 
116. See id. (providing a representative list of SWFs that includes the Alaska 
Permanent Fund); see also Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, SWF INSTITUTE, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/alaska-permanent-fund-corporation (last visited Nov. 
7, 2011) (detailing information about Alaska’s Permanent Fund, including information 
about oil and gas licensing fees).  
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dollar, have transformed the region into the world’s 
manufacturing center, which has led to a trade surplus and 
growth in sovereign economic wealth. Some countries, such as 
Canada and Norway, established funds for the purpose of 
funding social programs—for example, public pension and 
health programs. 
There have been many attempts to create different 
classification systems for SWFs.117 For the purposes of this 
Article, the IMF classification works best since it breaks SWFs 
into five different types according to the objective of the fund:118 
(1) Stabilization Funds are used primarily by oil rich nations 
“to insulate the budget and the economy from volatile 
commodity prices.”119 
(2) Savings Funds for Future Generations convert assets from 
the sale of natural resources into a “diversified portfolio of 
international financial assets to provide for future 
generations.”120 
(3) Reserve Investment Corporations are state-owned entities 
that are designed to increase the rate of return on currency 
reserves.121 
(4) Development Funds are created to fund “priority 
socioeconomic projects, such as infrastructure.” 122 
(5) Contingent Pension Reserves are created to help fund 
commitment by governments to provide pensions.123 
Naturally, different types of funds have different objectives, 
risk levels, and motivations behind the investment. Generally, 
                                                                                                                                  
117. See Adam Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign 
Wealth Funds 11 (Aug. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1652701. Some typologies classify 
SWFs according to the funding source, while others use objective to distinguish types of 
funds. Adam Dixon and Ashby Monk propose a unique system that classifies “according 
to the role they play in sovereignty and what underlies their claims to legitimacy 
without their respective nation state.” Id. at 12. 
118. International Monetary Fund, Annex 1.2. Sovereign Wealth Funds, in GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 45–46 (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/gfsr/2007/02/pdf/annex12.pdf. 
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countries have gradually moved their investments from bonds to 
a more diversified portfolio that includes the securities of 
American corporations. 
B. Global Macroeconomic Stability and Sustainability 
The international community first expressed anxiety that 
non-US SWFs might invest for political rather than economic 
purposes in 2007; the topic has been the subject of many law 
review articles since then.124 Citing a lack of transparency and 
accountability in some funds (e.g., Chile, China, Dubai, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Taiwan, and Venezuela),125 the IMF feared that some 
investments might be made for strategic purposes rather than 
for wealth creation. Legal and economic scholars Ronald Gilson 
and Curtis Milhaupt identified the phenomenon of SWFs with a 
political agenda as the “new mercantilism.”126 Under this 
conception, developing countries with wealthy SWFs may seek to 
invest in companies in order to gain some degree of corporate 
control and then use that control to “maximize economic, 
social, and political benefits” for that country.127 
Investments might be strategic either geopolitically or by 
industry/technology.128 Economist Gerard Lyons predicts that 
SWFs will “boost strategic links with countries that have not 
shared fully in globalization or which have been shunned by the 
West; and to take more strategic stakes in sensitive areas within 
developed countries.”129 For example, a non-US power could 
                                                                                                                                  
124. See Joseph J. Norton, The ‘Santiago Principles’ for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case 
Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 645, 648–51 
(2010). See, e.g., George S. Everly III, Comment, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Shareholder 
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125. States with a high degree of transparency include Canada, Malaysia, Norway, 
and Singapore (Temasek). See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1345, 1355–56, 1360 (2008). 
126. Id. at 1346. 
127. See id. 
128. See Lyons, supra note 113, at 192–94. 
129. Id. at 179. 
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make an investment in order to get competitive market 
information for the purpose of improving a state-owned 
enterprise.130 More nefariously, a country’s investment could be 
made in order to transfer technology in violation of intellectual 
property or state security laws. Such potentially strategic 
investments include companies in the telecom, energy, media, 
financial, and technology arenas. Alternatively, a SWF may try to 
dominate the economy of a poorer country by gaining 
ownership to the country’s national resources or other assets. 
In addition to fears over strategic investments, there is also 
fear over the ease with which markets can be manipulated 
through financial leverage.131 In 2007, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox expressed 
concern over the lack of transparency in SWF transactions and 
the ability to manipulate the market through insider trading.132 
Given the lack of transparency in disclosing portfolio holdings, 
there is no way to monitor how a SWF may exercise its 
shareholder voting rights. Moreover, SWFs gain an advantage 
over private players in the market given that their borrowing 
costs are lower and SWFs have “security and intelligence 
apparatus that may offer them access to information not 
available to other market participants.”133 
The risk of SWFs being used by corrupt heads of state to 
funnel money out of the country also became an issue in 
February 2011 when a revolt to overthrow Col. Muammar el-
Qaddafi started in Libya.134 Assets of the Libyan Investment 
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Authority were frozen in order to prevent Col. el-Qaddafi from 
using the money.135 Some companies that had sought 
investments from the Libyan Investment Authority were 
embarrassed by the association with the dictator, and 
speculation rose that firms may rethink how they approach 
SWFs in the future.136 After the fall of the el-Qaddafi regime, a 
new director of the Libyan Investment Authority sought to 
investigate the entity’s investments through the creation of an 
independent committee.137 The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission also investigated allegations of bribery by US-based 
investment banks in their dealings with the entity.138  
C. Regulation, Voluntary Standards, and the Dangers of Protectionism 
A number of constraints already serve to monitor SWF 
investment in US companies. Official US policy is to encourage 
free trade and globalization, including cross-border investment, 
while still protecting national securities interests.139 In order to 
accomplish these goals, the United States uses a combination of 
federal laws governing foreign investment, bilateral treaties, and 
monitoring through organizations such as the IMF. This Section 
will examine those methods of constraint and also examine 
recent proposals to further restrict SWF investment. 
1. Existing US Regulations 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(“CFIUS”) is the US governmental body charged with 
monitoring the national security implications of foreign 
investment.140 CFIUS consists of fourteen members from the 
executive branch who have the ability to recommend that an 
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investment by non-US investors, including SWFs, be blocked or 
to set conditions on the investment if the committee determines 
that the transaction threatens national security.141 
Some concern arose in Congress when CFIUS determined 
that the purchase of leases to manage several major US ports by 
a United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) entity was not a threat to 
national security.142 The UAE entity backed off, but Congress 
later passed legislation that, through reporting requirements, 
attempts to hold CFIUS accountable to Congress prior to 
approving a transaction.143 Since then, commentators mostly 
agree that CFIUS adequately protects US interests without 
hindering global investment, though some scholars have called 
for increased scrutiny.144 Legal scholar Joel Slawotsky makes the 
point that some countries, such as Singapore, UAE, and 
Venezuela, have multiple SWFs making simultaneous 
investments in the same industry sector or even company.145 
Slawotsky maintains that for such nations “there must be a 
rebuttable presumption that the home state is ultimately in 
control of the investment decisions for each of the SWFs . . . 
[and a]ny holdings such funds have in the same company 
should be aggregated.”146 Interestingly, the mere fact that 
CFIUS exists has led to investment patterns by SWFs to try to 
avoid investigation by CFIUS. By staying away from sensitive 
industries and keeping investments small, SWFs avoid the gaze 
of CFIUS.147 
Like any investment funds, SWFs are also subject to the 
regulatory framework and mandatory disclosures required by 
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state and federal securities laws.148 The securities laws lead to 
more transparency when SWFs gain a degree of control over a 
corporation. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 13(d) 
requires that any investor holding five percent of a public 
company’s securities disclose the investment as well as disclosing 
any plans to acquire further control or liquidation.149 The Bank 
Holding Company Act requires approval by the Federal Reserve 
if an entity seeks to acquire a twenty-five percent ownership in 
any bank or bank holding company.150 
Additionally, bilateral investment treaties also establish 
more transparency and accountability. By 2008, the United 
States had entered into nine bilateral investment treaties with 
countries that have SWFs.151 In March 2008, Abu Dhabi and 
Singapore agreed to bilateral treaties that included provisions as 
to investment and governance standards.152 In such bilateral 
treaties, the United States agrees that it will not engage in 
protectionist policies in regard to SWF investments.153 
2. Proposals–Decoupling Voting Rights 
Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt suggest that voting 
rights be temporarily decoupled from stock purchased by 
SWFs.154 Gilson and Milhaupt propose that the suspension of 
voting rights would only last as long as the SWF held the shares 
so that the resale value of the stock would not be affected.155 
Under this model, SWFs with a political or strategic agenda 
might not purchase shares, since they would have no voting 
rights to exercise control over a corporation. Only SWFs with a 
profit motive would purchase such shares, or so the theory 
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goes.156 The Gilson and Milhaupt idea is compelling; however, 
such passive investing (i.e. investment without shareholder 
control) creates corporate governance problems. If too many 
shareholders are removed from the governance process, then 
boards and executives may engage in corporate waste.157 
Moreover, investors with a wealth maximization motive have 
legitimate, non-political motives for exercising voting rights. 
The Gilson and Milhaupt proposal has been criticized as 
overly reactionary and possibly harmful to domestic interests.158 
One difficulty with controls specific to SWFs is that restrictions 
will likely inhibit economic interdependence, which has been 
argued to help ease tensions in global conflict.159 On the other 
hand, there are legitimate national security and economic fears. 
It would be naïve to think that a non-US government would not 
manipulate the US economy for its own political aims. No single 
solution is likely to negate the dangers posed by SWFs engaged 
in economic hegemony. Increased regulation of investment will 
interrupt the free flow of capital and depress financial markets 
at a time when US bank liquidity is at risk. 
3. Codes of Conduct 
Through a joint IMF and World Bank initiative, twenty-six 
countries with SWFs developed a voluntary “best practices” code 
of conduct to allay fears that SWFs are seeking to exert political 
influence.160 The IMF international working group met three 
times during 2008 and eventually agreed upon “a set of 
generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP) that 
properly reflects their investment practices and objectives.” at in 
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meeting in Santiago, Chile.161 The principles, which have come 
to be known as “The Santiago Principles” have the following 
objectives: 
“i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free 
flow of capital and investment; 
ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure 
requirements in the countries in which they invest; 
iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and 
return-related considerations; and 
iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance 
structure that provides for adequate operational controls, 
risk management, and accountability.”162 
Reaction to the Santiago Principles was cautiously 
optimistic; yet concern still lingers about challenges in 
accountability. The Santiago Principles help “demystify the 
methodology of sovereign wealth funds and how they invest.”163 
The working group adopted twenty-four guiding principles that 
included detailed explanatory notes to give guidance on matters 
of disclosure, investment intent, and governance standards.164 By 
adopting the principles, the working group hoped also to 
“contribute to the stability of the global financial system, reduce 
protectionist pressures, and help maintain an open and stable 
investment climate.”165 
One follow-up to the 2008 Santiago Principles was the 
establishment, in 2009, of the International Forum of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (“IFSWF”)—a voluntary group of representatives 
from SWFs that meets periodically and “exchanges views on 
issues of common interest, and facilitates an understanding of 
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the Santiago Principles and SWFs’ activities.”166 While voluntary 
codes of conduct might create a norm, there is no accountability 
if and when an SWF violates such a code. At best the IFSWF 
brings together “a ‘global community’ of SWFs” where the 
enforcement of norms is through “internal peer review and 
other forms of periodic assessment . . . .”167 
Some western countries are skeptical of voluntary 
agreements given the lack of accountability.168 Scholars have 
suggested “striking a careful balance between the need for 
foreign capital and the danger of foreign governments 
interfering in sensitive sectors of the economy,” and that 
voluntary norms such as the Santiago Principles are just a first 
step “to achieve some consensus in the controversial global 
economic realm.”169 
4. Increased Regulation and Protectionism 
Economist Gerard Lyons predicts that Western nations are 
likely to implement protectionist policies to restrict SWF 
investment in their countries.170 In fact, protectionist policies 
were considered after the alarm was raised in 2007 by Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United States.171 After the IMF report was released, Germany 
increased its controls,172 and the United States considered 
whether to tighten rules by requiring passive investments.173 Yet 
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protectionism will hurt global trade.174 Notwithstanding 
restrictions on foreign investment, US public opinion has 
generally turned away from free trade in recent years, and 
America’s allies fear there could be a cascading effect on global 
gross domestic product (“GDP”) that could result in a long 
recession if the United States begins to disfavor free trade.175 
Additionally, there has been a political backlash against 
SWFs given that many countries receive favorable tax treatment 
on investments under a theory of sovereign immunity. Given the 
recent growth in funds as a result of increased prices in 
commodities, analysts have begun to question whether gains by 
non-US SWFs should be taxed.176 Some scholars have gone so far 
as to suggest that prohibitions be made on SWF investments if 
the host country has “failed to provide adequate health care, 
access to education, or some assurance of personal security to its 
citizens.”177 
D. Post–Financial Crisis Shifts in Attitude 
A recent study from the Brookings Institution suggests the 
fears about SWFs are unfounded given the behavior and motives 
of many funds.178 Moreover, the study suggests that given the 
objectives of SWFs, foreign capital from sovereigns can be an 
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important source of development funds for both the private and 
public sectors.179 
In contrast to fears raised in the media, Brookings found 
that most SWFs “are inherently cautious, focused on capital 
preservation, asset diversification, predictable returns, and the 
mitigation of political risk.”180 Rather than seeking complete 
control of a company, “most limit their equity ownership stake 
in public companies, financial institutions and private businesses 
to minority status and eschew direct management 
responsibility.”181 SWFs with the objective to fund national 
pension programs were singled out as exemplars of conservative 
and conventional portfolio management.182 Countries vary 
widely on the investment constraints for its national pension 
funds.183 Some, such as Norway, limit the investment in equities 
to thirty-five percent of the fund’s assets; whereas, Australia has 
no limits on any asset class.184 
SWFs are historically long-term investors whose goal is to 
maximize wealth.185 Professional money managers trained in 
western investment principles typically manage the funds.186 
SWF investments appear to be apolitical, according to the 
Brookings study.187 China’s investments might be termed 
strategic, since many are focused on the energy and natural 
resource sectors, though those investments are thought to be 
made for economic purposes, since China lacks many of the 
resources it needs to maintain its position as the world’s leading 
manufacturer.188 
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SWFs also favor minority stakes and do not seek out board 
seats.189 There may be some disincentives for a SWF to seek out 
controlling shares, since the public entity would then need to 
hold directors accountable for poor performance.190 In another 
study, researchers confirmed that SWFs acquired a seat on a 
company’s board of directors in less than fifteen percent of the 
investments studied.191 If SWFs are incentivized to increase 
returns, then it might be in its own interest to be a passive 
investor. The study found that “abnormal performance worsens 
the larger the stake acquired . . . and if the SWF takes a seat on 
the board of directors.”192 
The one area that still gives pause to those concerned about 
SWFs is that which concerns accountability and transparency. 
The implementation of the Santiago Principles has been “highly 
uneven,” with some countries fulfilling the mandates only 
partially.193 The Brookings study suggests that “[p]ositive 
feedback loops through transparency ratings from trusted 
brands would encourage [SWFs] to be more open about their 
actions.”194 Another study found that target firms and SWFs 
prefer to “structure transactions in a way that matches up with 
recipient country ideals” and then disclose the terms in order to 
reduce transaction costs.195 Not only does such disclosure have 
an immediate effect of easing public concern, it also “conditions 
the market for future transactions, which may reduce 
transaction costs for transactions with other SWFs and for 
subsequent investments by the same SWF.”196 
What is most interesting about the Brookings study is the 
shift in attitude towards SWFs. Their findings acknowledge that 
both public and private entities rely on foreign capital. Given 
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the rising government deficit as well as a crumbling 
infrastructure, some US projects may not get funded if not 
through SWF investments. Since the report concludes SWFs are 
generally non-political conservative investors, it recommends 
policies that would encourage SWF investment—a sharp 
turnaround from the generally held view, only four years earlier, 
that SWFs posed a threat.197 The study was driven partially 
because SWF investments in the United States dropped as a 
result of the financial crisis, as these funds turned towards 
funding projects in their respective home countries.198 
SWFs serve as an interesting example of government 
investment funds that have successfully invested in order to 
build pension reserves without incurring significant political 
interference in private enterprise. 
VI. SWFS AS A MODEL FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST 
FUND 
The following Part examines some of the most successful 
SWFs that manage social insurance fund assets and the methods 
used by such funds to keep investment decision-making 
apolitical while still maintaining accountability. In the last 
fifteen years, countries have increasingly incorporated social 
insurance reserve funds that employ modern portfolio theory 
into their pay-as-you-go financing systems.199 Countries that have 
diversified their public pension reserve funds include Australia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and 
Thailand.200 Such funds allow the countries to partially pre-fund 
their programs in order to “mitigate financial issues raised by 
changing demographics, balance intergenerational fairness, 
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improve adequacy, and better ensure the sustainability of the 
schemes.”201 
Comparing the different funds presents difficulties in part 
because of differing legal systems, objectives, and reporting 
schemes among the funds. The OECD classifies the group of 
SWFs under consideration in this Article as Public Pension 
Reserve Funds and breaks it into two subcategories: Social 
Security Reserve Funds, where the source of funds is the surplus 
from employment taxes; and Sovereign Pension Reserve Funds, 
where the government provides funds for the trust.202 For the 
purpose of this Article, funds include both categories provided 
that the fund invests in a diversified portfolio. 
Some confusion may arise in the use of the term “public 
pension,” which in the United States usually refers to a program 
such as the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust—a 
pension plan set up for the benefit of a group of government 
employees.203 For the purposes of this Section, the term “public 
pensions” will also refer to funds that exist to finance social 
insurance programs. This Section first examines the 
performance of diversified funds that have good governance 
attributes, and then examines the characteristics that foster 
apolitical, wealth-oriented investment. 
A. SWF Public Pension Performance 
Well-managed SWFs that invest in diversified portfolios for 
the purpose of funding public pensions can outperform bond-
only portfolios over the long-term.204 This Section examines the 
performance of some of the most successful funds. As noted 
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above, comparing performance data between international 
funds is problematic. Many factors affect performance, such as 
asset allocations. A fund that is heavily weighted in bonds will 
not do as well in the long-term as a more diversified fund.205 
New Zealand’s SWF reflects this fact. With over sixty percent of 
its assets invested in equities, the New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund is among the best performing funds, showing an 
annualized nominal return of 7.83% between 2003 and 2011.206 
Other factors that affect performance include the length of 
time that a fund has been in existence. Funds that have existed 
for longer than ten years show less of an impact from the 2007–
2009 financial crisis on the average rate of return than funds 
that were investing for only a short time. For example, the 
Australian Future Fund has an annualized average return of only 
3.5%; however, the fund started in 2006—right on the cusp of 
the financial crisis and stock market decline.207 The effect of the 
financial crisis has skewed annualized returns even for funds 
with a ten-year track record. The Canadian Pension Plan 
Investment Board has an annualized rate of return of 5.9% since 
it began investing in 2001.208 While the return is not as robust as 
some other funds, some of the assets are invested in longer-term 
investments such as real estate and infrastructure, which are just 
beginning to regain value after the economic downturn of 
2007–2009.209 
One fund that successfully employed market timing by 
selling equities before the financial crisis was China’s National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF), which reported an annualized 
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return of 9.17% from 2000 through 2010.210 The NSSF is the 
country’s largest pension fund,211 and was set up to be the safety 
net for provinces that could not meet their future national 
pension obligations.212 Equity investments comprised about fifty-
three percent of assets as of December 2009.213 When first 
formed, investment returns “were modest” given that the 
portfolio consisted of mostly government bonds and cash.214 
However, China’s NSSF yielded high returns in 2006–2007 as it 
began to increase equity investments in China’s volatile stock 
market.215 Unlike most buy and hold pension fund investors, 
China’s NSSF benefited from a bull market in 2006 and the first 
half of 2007, but then sold off a large percentage of its equity 
investments as the market began to turn in 2007 and 2008.216 
The excellent returns in 2006 and 2007 of 29.01% and 43.19% 
more than offset the modest returns of earlier years.217 
Moreover, the lack of significant exposure to equities during the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 put the NSSF in a much better 
position than similar funds.218 The track record alone, however, 
is not justification for the NSSF to be a model for the US Social 
Security Trust Fund. Commentators have expressed concern 
over China’s lack of transparency and disclosure in running the 
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NSSF.219 The objectives and purpose of the fund are unclear, 
leading some to speculate that political pressure could result in 
a “misuse of the funds.”220 
Returns suffer when the government interferes in the 
management of a fund and forces the board to make politically 
motivated investments. For example, the Irish National Pension 
Reserve Fund was established in 2000 with the goal to partially 
fund payments for “social welfare pensions and public service 
pensions” starting in 2025.221 From 2001 to 2010, the fund’s 
Discretionary Portfolio had a modest annualized return of 
3.5%.222 The substandard performance, when compared to its 
peers, may be partially explained by the 2009 Irish government 
intervention, which forced the fund to invest in failing Irish 
banks—an investment that has drawn down the performance of 
the fund.223 
B. Fund Governance Characteristics 
In a recent study, Kevin Whitman, of the Social Security 
Administration, identified five governance characteristics that 
could be used to evaluate a proposal to diversify the Social 
Security Trust Fund.224 These characteristics are: 1) legal status; 
2) mandate; 3) governing board characteristics; 4) investment 
policy and management; and 5) oversight.225  
By analyzing the structure and governance of the National 
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust, Whitman establishes the 
factors in government employee pension trusts that “shape 
program investment operations, define their level of 
independence, and determine the manner in which they engage 
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with political actors.”226 Using these characteristics, this Section 
analyzes best practices for SWF governance using case studies 
done by the World Bank and OECD, as well as guidelines 
produced by the OECD and the International Social Security 
Association on good governance for managing pension and 
social security trusts.227 
1. Legal Status 
Legal status refers to the nature of the fund as a legal 
entity—that is, the extent to which it is independent from 
existing government agencies and the political arm of the 
government. In a 2008 report, the World Bank identified an 
independent institutional structure as an important element in 
insulating financial operations from political influence.228 If the 
government has direct control over the fund, then there is a 
temptation to use the funds for purposes other than social 
insurance.229 Establishing a segregated model not only lessens 
the possibility of political interference, it also affects the nature 
of the other characteristics by allowing for “greater clarity in 
mandate and objectives” and better oversight because of 
“greater transparency and accountability of a segregated fund’s 
governing body.”230 The legal structure of a separate fund also 
impacts investment policy and management, since investment 
professionals are more easily recruited to a fund than to a 
government agency.231 
The World Bank study examined public pension SWFs in 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and Norway. In the first three of 
those countries, the public pension SWFs were created as 
“separate state entities with their own board of directors.”232 The 
Canadian Public Pension Investment Board (CPPIB) is a 
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government corporation and, therefore, a separate legal entity, 
which operates outside of the federal and provincial 
government agency structure in Canada.233 Although deemed to 
be a government entity, the status as a corporation allows the 
CPPIB to operate in the same manner as a private investment 
entity.234 Similarly, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund and 
the Irish National Pensions Reserve Fund were formed as 
separate entities with independent boards.235 
In Norway, no separate entity exists though other controls 
keep the fund functionally immune from massive political 
manipulation. The Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF-G) 
is managed by the Ministry of Finance, “which makes all 
strategic decisions, formulates investment policy objectives, and 
sets the strategic asset allocation and benchmarks.”236 The 
Ministry appointed Norges Bank, Norway’s central bank, to 
manage the assets of the trust, which removes day-to-day 
operations away from the government.237 However, the 
agreement can be terminated by either party with only one 
year’s notice.238 Despite its lack of independence, Norway’s GPF-
 G has avoided political interference in part because of a law that 
limits public spending from oil revenue—the source of funds for 
the trust—so “that the annual structural budget deficit should 
not exceed [four] percent of Fund assets.”239 
If the United States were to diversify the Social Security 
Trust Fund, the most important first step would be to establish a 
separate entity outside of the usual agency structure. Federal 
government corporations would likely be the best model since 
they are a step removed from the political process and allow the 
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government to operate using business methods not normally 
available to agencies.240 
2. Mandate 
The World Bank recommends that public pension funds be 
given a “clear and unequivocal commercial mandate . . . to 
maximize investment returns, subject to a prudent level of risk, 
and after taking fully into account the structure of its liabilities 
and the length of its investment horizon.”241 If the US Social 
Security Trust Fund is diversified, then creating a clear mandate 
would be critical to its success, since the size of the trust “makes 
political interference more likely.”242 
Canada’s public pension trust is a good example of the 
successful implementation the World Bank recommendation. 
The CPPIB Act provides that the object of the fund is to achieve 
“a maximum rate of return, without undue risk of loss.”243 The 
New Zealand fund has a similar mandate and its board is 
charged with “investing the fund on a commercial and prudent 
basis in order to maximize investment returns without incurring 
undue risks.”244 The goal of maximizing returns is often 
tempered by other requirements. The CCPIB must also take into 
account “the factors that may affect the funding of the Canada 
Pension Plan and the ability of the Canada Pension Plan to meet 
its financial obligations on any given business day.”245 The New 
Zealand fund must also invest assets in such a way as to “avoid[] 
prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member 
of the world community.”246 
Despite their mandate to maximize returns, public pension 
funds have sometimes come under pressure from politicians and 
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activist groups for investing in controversial firms. For example, 
the CPPIB has been criticized by activist groups for, among 
other things, its investments in arms manufacturers and tobacco 
companies.247 The CPPIB response has been to adopt the United 
Nations Principles on Responsible Investment, which are also 
endorsed by the other three nations.248 The principles state that 
“responsible corporate behavior with respect to environmental, 
social and governance [“ESG”] factors can have a positive 
influence on financial performance over time.”249 However, 
CPPIB maintains investments that achieve its mandate of 
maximizing risk adjusted returns and stops short of divesting 
itself in tobacco and munitions companies. Rather, the CPPIB 
seeks to engage in a dialogue with companies on ESG issues in 
order to seek corporate practices that will maximize long-term 
financial gain.250 
Norway’s GPF-G is likely the largest of the public pension 
plans that has become more aggressively activist in the 
application of ESG issues to its investments. In 2004, Norway 
mandated that the GPF-G establish an Advisory Council on 
Ethics and divest itself of companies that produced certain types 
of weapons or otherwise engaged in activities that violated 
environmental, social, and governance factors, such as human 
rights abuses, pollution, etc.251 As a result, Norway divested itself 
of investments in Wal-Mart on the basis of “human rights and 
labour rights,” including the employment of child labor.252 The 
manager of the GPF-G, Norges Bank, maintains that application 
of environmental, social, and governance factors is distinguished 
from political pressure because of “the relationship that exists 
between well-regulated and morally legitimate markets and 
companies on the one hand, and long-term returns for 
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diversified investors on the other.”253 Although the Norwegian 
fund’s annualized return of 7.9% suggests that the fund is 
managed for the purpose of wealth creation, “the 
macroeconomic and ethics based actions of the funds suggest 
that Norway is consciously pursuing state policy indirectly 
through its funds.”254 
Given its funding problems, the mandate for a diversified 
Social Security Trust Fund should follow the lead of other 
countries and specify that the fund should maximize risk 
adjusted returns allowing for the necessary liquidity to honor 
future obligations. If the Social Security Trust Fund were to 
diversify, a great deal of pressure would no doubt be exercised 
to require that the fund not invest in companies or industries 
that are not deemed socially responsible. One solution that 
would avoid the decision over whether a company is ethical 
enough for the investment would be to invest entirely through 
broad-based index funds, such as the Wilshire 5000. Even if it 
takes that approach, the Trust Fund should certainly adopt—at 
a minimum—the United Nations Principles on Responsible 
Investment. To the extent that the Trust Fund owns shares in 
companies directly, it could effectively follow the example of the 
CPPIB by actively engaging the company in a dialogue and 
voting its shares for responsible corporate behavior. 
3. Governing Board Characteristics 
The term governing board characteristics refers to the 
procedures by which board members are appointed and the 
requisite qualifications. While a fund may be a separate legal 
entity, politicians might be able to exert political influence over 
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investment policy through the appointment process. 
Consequently, safeguards against political influence are 
important in the vetting process for directors if the fund is to 
stay independent. 
In Canada, the appointment process for the CPPIB’s twelve-
member board of directors is structured to achieve a managing 
body that has both financial expertise and is representative of 
the different provinces.255 Appointing a director is a two-step 
process. First, a committee that includes representatives from 
each province creates a list of candidates. Second, the federal 
finance minster with the recommendation of the provincial 
finance ministers then selects the final directors.256 The board of 
directors in turn appoints the day-to-day professional money 
managers; thereby removing the investment decision further 
away from the political influence.257  
A two-step process also exists in New Zealand. Although the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund board is ultimately 
appointed by the government, an independent nominating 
committee first proposes recommendations.258 The New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund Act of 2001 requires that board members 
“in the opinion of the minister, have substantial experience, 
training and expertise in the management of financial 
investments.”259 The board appointed a chief executive officer, 
and the fund is run on a day to day basis by a staff of 
professional money managers.260 
The Irish government does not use a nominating 
committee like Canada and New Zealand, it directly appoints 
seven commissioners to run the National Pensions Reserve 
Fund.261 The terms are staggered and each commissioner has to 
meet certain qualifications, such as having “substantial expertise 
and experience at a senior level in a broad range of areas,” 
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which could include the financial industry, but might be in 
another area, such as consumer protection or the civil service.262 
The required financial expertise of directors differs among 
funds with New Zealand likely having the strictest requirements 
that every member have substantial investment knowledge and 
experience.263 The World Bank study notes, however, that it is an 
issue that none of the funds studied requires that board 
members “have adequate knowledge of modern financial 
instruments and strategies.”264 Given the increase in the use of 
derivatives and absolute return strategies, this may be an 
important qualification to consider adding to the requirements. 
In order to foster an environment where investment returns 
are maximized and apolitical, the Social Security Trust Fund 
would likely benefit from being run by a small—no more than 
ten-person—independent board composed solely of financial 
professionals.265 There should be fixed terms that are staggered, 
and the appointment process should include a non-political 
nominating committee that creates a short-list of qualified 
volunteers. The expertise on the board should include a 
significant number of members who are skilled in complex 
financial instruments, such as derivatives. 
4. Investment Policy and Management 
The investment policy of a fund should, naturally, be 
structured in order to achieve its mandate. The policy should 
include guidelines and strategies on issues such as asset 
allocation, international investment, time horizon, target return, 
and similar financial metrics. For many funds, policy is normally 
set at the board level and then implemented by managers.266 
However, in the case of Norway, policy decisions are decided by 
the Ministry of Finance.267 Funds typically have a long horizon 
for investments given the wealth maximization mandate.268 
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Funds are highly diversified with investments spread out over 
bonds, public equities, real estate, private equity, emerging 
markets, and hedge funds.269 Some funds build large internal 
staffs of investment professionals while others rely on outside 
managers.270 
The CCPIB has an actively managed portfolio where the 
focus is on a long-term global investment strategy.271 The fund is 
managed by a chief executive officer, who is appointed by the 
board, and a team of investment professionals.272 Canadian 
assets account for only 48.3% of its portfolio, and many 
investments, such as infrastructure and real estate, are made 
with a long horizon of fifteen to over twenty years in order to 
realize the full return.273 The aspirational reference portfolio 
requires sixty-five percent equity and thirty-five percent debt.274 
In the actual portfolio, bonds, money market investments, and 
other debt make up only 32.8% of the asset allocation.275 
Equities—both foreign and domestic—account for 53.5%, and 
infrastructure and real estate comprise the remaining 13.7% of 
the portfolio.276 The highly diversified Canadian fund has 
required an expansion of the staff in recent years as it began to 
more actively manage its portfolio. This has increased the 
management costs of the portfolio, though the overall costs are 
within reason.277 That said, commentators maintain that the 
strategy and cost of active management will need to be 
monitored in coming years.278 
The New Zealand Superannuation Fund board is obligated 
by law to employ “best practice portfolio management.”279 After 
consulting outside investment advisors, the board adopted an 
asset allocation that was broadly diversified across classes, 
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sectors, and location.280 New Zealand equities accounted for 
only 7.5% of assets according to a 2005 review.281 The fund is 
managed on a day-to-day level by a chief executive officer and a 
small staff. However, external managers, who are appointed by 
the board after a rigorous review process, manage the day-to-day 
investments.282 
Many funds—Canada, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand—
started out as passive investors and have since transitioned to 
active investing in order to “raise expected returns while 
keeping risks under control.”283 The activist investment policies 
of mature funds are not likely to be immediately appropriate for 
the US Social Security Trust Fund. Even successfully managed 
activist funds like Canada’s transitioned over time from a passive 
approach to an activist approach.284 
As a practical matter, in order for the United States to 
diversify Social Security Trust Fund assets, Congress would first 
have to pass legislation that transforms the special-issue 
government bonds into marketable instruments so that the 
Trust Fund could then resell the securities into the secondary 
market.285 It is uncertain, however, how well the secondary 
market would absorb the sale of these securities. Demand for US 
government bonds was still high in August 2011, even as 
Standard & Poors downgraded the US credit rating.286 Bond 
yields were at historic lows since the US debt was seen as a safe 
haven given uncertainty over European sovereign debt and 
continued economic growth.287 If demand continues to remain 
high, then the securities could be more easily sold into the 
secondary market. One plan to diversify calls for investing forty 
                                                                                                                                  
280. Id. at 57. 
281. Id. 
282. See id. at 58. 
283. Id. at 61. 
284. See id. at 42–45. 
285. Id. at 7. The Canadian Pension Plan provides a precedent for diversifying out 
of a bond-only portfolio. When it adopted the diversified investment strategy, the 
Canadian system had financing problems similar to those that the US Social Security 
system currently faces. See CAN. PENSION PLAN INV. BD., supra note 271, at 6. 
286. See Deborah Levine, Treasurys Up after Good Auction, Global Worries, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 10, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
treasurys-mostly-extend-rally-push-new-lows-2011-08-10. 
287. Id. 
146 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:98 
percent of the US$2.6 trillion Trust Fund—just over US$1 
trillion—into equities. That would increase the US debt held by 
the public by about ten percent to US$10.9 trillion.288 In 
devising a plan to diversify, government economists will need to 
gradually sell the bonds in the secondary market so as not to 
produce significant adverse effects on the government’s ability 
to issue new bonds. 
5. Oversight 
Given the amount of money at stake, the independence of a 
public pension fund has to be balanced by a system of oversight 
that holds the fund accountable to the government and the 
contributors to the system. Oversight measures may involve 
review by government agencies and political entities, timely 
reporting requirements, independent auditing of financial 
statements, and the possibility of legal action to enjoin the 
trust.289 In addition to oversight by outside entities, the board 
may have oversight measures to monitor the activities of 
managers, such as audit committees. 
The purpose of reporting requirements is to heighten the 
degree of transparency and therefore accountability. The CPPIB 
Act requires that the Canadian fund publish an annual report 
that includes audited financial statements—annual and 
quarterly—and to hold public meetings in each member 
province every two years.290 In contrast, the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund Board is subject to an independent review 
of its performance only once every five years. The New Zealand 
Treasury is expected to “monitor its activities on a regular 
basis.”291 In the case of Norway, the Ministry of Finance has to 
report to Parliament on fund performance, and the manager, 
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Norges Bank, reports on holdings and performance through a 
website.292 
The Canadian, Irish, and New Zealand funds have all set up 
standard corporate control including audit committees, 
standard-setting on issues like valuations, outside auditors to 
monitor performance, and use outside advisors to help the 
board determine key policy decisions such as asset allocations.293 
Oversight for a diversified Social Security Trust Fund 
should follow the best practices of other countries and publicly 
publish audited quarterly and annual reports. It should also be 
obligated to report to Congress on a regular basis. The Treasury 
would likely be vested with additional oversight responsibilities; 
however, to prevent political interference, the Treasury’s ability 
to act might be limited to bringing a lawsuit to prevent an ultra 
vires act not authorized by the Trust’s mandate.294 
6. The Threat of Government Legislation 
Even though a country may adopt the best practices to 
foster board independence and avoid political intrusion, most 
funds are not immune from the possibility of the government 
passing new legislation to thwart the goals of the fund. As Irish 
citizens discovered, the government can easily suspend the 
independence of a fund it creates. In 2009, the Irish 
government forced the originally independent National Pension 
Reserve Fund to purchase €7 billion in stock in order to bolster 
the capital of Irish banks.295 The fund was, in effect, forced to go 
against its original mandate to maximize returns, since the 
investment in the Irish banks was not one that a fiduciary would 
normally make.296 The investment has proven costly for the Irish 
National Pension Reserve Fund. While the fund’s regular 
portfolio has garnered a twenty percent return in 2009, the 
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investment in the banks lost €400 million by November 2010.297 
In May 2011, the Allied Irish Banks announced that it could not 
pay a €280 million dividend owed to the fund and offered 
additional stock in lieu of the payment.298 
Similar threats exist for other funds. The French 
Parliament passed legislation in 2010 that requires the country’s 
Pension Reserve Fund to sell assets in order to repay the short-
term debt needs of the country’s welfare system.299 Originally, 
the fund was given a much longer investment horizon so that 
disbursements could not be made until 2020;300 however, now 
the politically motivated legislation requires the fund to reduce 
its forty percent asset allocation in stocks, which will likely result 
in a much lower long-term return.301 The potential for 
government intervention in New Zealand does not even require 
an act of Parliament. The Minister of Finance is authorized to 
direct the trust fund to undertake a certain action; thereby 
cutting off the independent nature of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund. However, any directive has to be in 
writing, presented to the New Zealand Parliament, and 
published.302 
Some potential controls on government intervention exist 
through the political process and potentially as a constitutional 
mandate. For example, an irate electorate would be a check on 
politicians who interfere with a fund. However, the greatest 
protection for a trust fund would be a constitutional 
amendment that explicitly bans political meddling and preserves 
the board’s independence.303 
Although the recent events in Ireland and France are 
unfortunate, the success in other countries indicates that public 
pension SWFs can be successful provided that they are 
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organized to exhibit the following characteristics: (1) political 
neutrality; (2) transparency; (3) accountability; (4) strong 
governance; (5) a mandate to maximize returns as adjusted for 
risk; (6) long-term horizons for investments; and (7) adequate 
resources.304 
CONCLUSION 
The last ten years have seen a significant shift in the way 
countries manage public pension and social insurance reserve 
funds. Rather than invest solely in government bonds, countries 
now employ modern portfolio techniques to diversify assets and 
earn a higher rate of return. Even after considering the losses 
incurred during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, non-US 
sovereign wealth funds that have managed to remain apolitical 
have competitive returns and sometimes outperform the market. 
Curiously, the United States has not followed suit even 
though the long-term benefits of a diversified portfolio are well-
known. The reasons for this economically irrational behavior 
likely stem from beliefs underlying the country’s neoliberal 
political economy, specifically regarding the role of government 
as an owner of private enterprise. Institutional studies suggest 
that the rules constraining government investment are not likely 
to change rapidly given the constraints of path dependence 
theory. However, the United States has seen incremental 
changes of attitudes towards government ownership. Many states 
that run venture capital funds and government employee 
pension funds have been successful as apolitical state investment 
entities. Moreover, attitudes towards SWFs have shifted from 
fear and anxiety over politically motivated investments, to a 
greater acceptance of the sovereign investors as wealth-
maximizing entities. Crisis also drives change. The Social 
Security Trust Fund is now expected to be depleted by 2036. 
Diversifying the Trust Fund could eliminate as much as thirty 
percent of Social Security’s funding deficit, without raising taxes 
or reducing benefits. 
Sovereign wealth funds that were created for the purpose of 
funding national pension systems provide a model for the 
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United States to form an independent entity that is apolitical yet 
able to be held accountable for its actions. As US politicians 
grasp for solutions to Social Security’s funding problems, they 
should consider adopting the successful SWF models used in 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in order to help partially 
prefund future benefits. 
